Truth and language

[Eric Vail]

I still hate that term. The very nature of science means it can't be theistic or atheistic. If people would understand that fact, they could move on and yell at each other about something else.

Ryan, again I encourage you to research the presuppositions behind claims such as this one that you are making.

"Science" as you call it developed precisely as a theological debate after the 30 Years War in Europe. Bacon, Newton, and Locke (i.e., British Empiricists) knew that every word that came off their quill was a theological statement--everything we do and say affirms something (good or bad) about God, our relation to him, and creation. The empirical (scientific) methodology was developed because of specific theological claims about fallen human nature and the world within the 17th and 18th centuries (see Peter Harrison's, "Original Sin and the Problem of Knowledge in Early Modern Europe"). In contrast to the rationalists, Bacon and his followers thought the fallen human mind and senses were prone to error. The fallen world also needed examination and correction. Thus, to solve both problems, they set up methods to "ensure" that the truly real could be discerned and we could possibly understand enough to make corrections to the world where needed. Newton's categories for this was apparent space and time vs. absolute space and time.

The empiricists were also trying to defend a place for God in the cosmos against those in the radical enlightenment. Newton's physics were consciously and intentionally a theological attempt at defending God. By figuring out all the laws of the universe, he hoped to show where God was necessary and the initiating cause of everything (see Michael Buckley's At the Origins of Modern Atheism for more on Newton and Clark). He intentionally argued that motion (force) is external to matter so that there was room for God.

Those in the radical enlightenment--taking their cues from Spinoza--argued along with anyone who tried to show the reasonableness of the cosmos. However, they argued for a single substance ontology where motion was within matter. Thus, their science was an explicit, intentional attempt at displacing God. "God" for them was what happens naturally within the world according to the characteristics of matter.

Your claim that the nature of science can't be theistic or atheistic is false on historical grounds. The difference between where we stand today and where the early scientists stood is that they were at least self-conscious and intentional about the theological implications of what they were claiming.

Within this early Enlightenment debate there was also a battle between the moderates and the radicals about the relation of faith and reason. The moderates wanted to keep them together. Locke called theology the first among the sciences. It gets to set the narrative and the boundaries of the discussion. For him faith/revelation is as rational (thus as worthy to be a foundation for a post- 30 years war society) as any other science. Thus, Locke taught toleration within the other disciplines so long as they adhered within the bounds of theological claims. For him, freedom was only freedom of conscience to pursue God and what he wants for us in life. The radicals, on the other hand, wanted to divorce faith and reason. They wanted to discredit faith (it had done that itself within religious wars) and base society on reason alone. Again, this was an intentional atheistic move. Reason--the sciences--gets to establish what is "fact" and what is "true" about the world apart from any faith claims of the church (i.e., what they called superstitions). Faith and morals become a hobby or something you can adopt for living within the "facts" of the world the sciences present to us.

We in the church and the broader culture have fully bought the fact-value split of Modernity without remembering the theological debates that raged in bringing it about. We've fully forgotten the theological implications that were at stake then and continue to be at stake by blindly following in the tracks of Modernity. We have so bought in to science's place as the broker of "facts" that we forget the historical contingency of the worldview that gives science that place and that believes it can tell us what is absolute (as Newton thought it could).

Remember that in the Modern turn the first questions of philosophy went from being 'what is real?' to 'how do we know?/how do we know what's real?'. This was the time period that some call 'the assertion of the human.' We finally in western culture started challenging the optimism of Aristotelian science in favor of the safe-guards of empiricists scientific method. We explored our limitations of knowledge and the implications of those limitations. The new type of optimism of this age, however, was that we can still know what is real; now we can even tell you how we know. The newest philosophical turn toward language is incredibly helpful to us. We once again have re-discovered the contextually contingent nature of truth/fact claims. We understand that we don't have direct contact with our world. We take everything in, process it, and understand it through a linguistic framework. We can know and understand according to how our linguistic construal of the world allows us to know and understand (for those truly fluent in multiple languages have multiple ways of processing the world).

Even Irenaeus had rough glimmers of the importance of worldview in the very early church when he was battling the gnostics. They were taking the data of what they knew of the world at that time and placing the pieces where they fit in their own narrative of God and the cosmos. Irenaeus wasn't criticizing the pieces. He was just criticizing the narrative. If you want to make a mozaic of a dog with a box of tiles, all that says about the tiles is that you've arranged them that way. It does not mean that a picture of a dog is intrinsic to the tiles. Raw data doesn't interpret itself; it is experienced within a worldview and given meaning within that worldview. Science doesn't (it can't) give us the "facts" of the world free from human subjectivity. The world can only be encountered in a linguistic framework. Right now that framework is a single substance ontology that was developed intentionally by early enlightenment atheists to leave no place for God and God's providence (general or special) within the natural world.

I fully sympathize with the heart of our Nazarene doctrine on scripture. I believe that we should not try to make scripture answer questions of history and science according to our modern methods. We must honor the genre of literature of the books of the bible and glean from those books what they are trying to say theologically about God, God's relation to us, our relation to God, and God's and our relationship to creation as a whole. I think that is what is at the heart of our Nazarene doctrine on scripture. However, we need to be cognizant of how much its wording is based on the cultural presuppositions of modernity: on the fact-value split. If we are not careful, by the way we define the relationship between revelation and the sciences, we will undercut the ability of God's self-revelation to provide the narrative (the worldview) through which we experience, process, and understand our world and the data (not facts) of the sciences.

I have a great deal of respect and admiration for Dr. Colling. My family spent many of my childhood Thanksgivings in his family's home; those are very dear memories. I have no wish to criticize him in posting this in a thread attached to him. I do hope, nevertheless, that our church will get better at exegeting the presuppositions our context. With such critical examination, it is my hope that we can once again find a healthier, fuller relationship between theology and the sciences.

[Ryan Scott]

Eric,

Thanks for the post. I think we simply have differing definitions of science. I view science as a very small, limited human tool.

You're right, of course, in illustrating how science has been used in attempts to allow for and disprove God. Science was still only a tool in these equations, just as it is a tool in this "battle" between some evolutionists and ID proponents.

We have so bought in to science's place as the broker of "facts" that we forget the historical contingency of the worldview that gives science that place and that believes it can tell us what is absolute (as Newton thought it could).

This is a key point, and one with which I whole-heartedly agree. But I still hold that science is not and cannot be theistic or athiestic, only the interpretations can be such.

One scientist looks at the data which has been collected and decides the idea of a creator is impossible. Another scientist looks at the same data and decides a creator must have existed. Both and right and both are wrong.

The problem I have with this whole scenario is with the attitudes I see on both sides. It seems like "the establishment" is afraid that something in their theory might be wrong. I've always thought that true scientists would love to proven wrong as this proof furthers overall knowledge. The "challengers" seem ready to inject an element which cannot be measured or tested - the very notion makes science obsolete. They would do better to find the points in the theory with which they are unconvinced and study those, searching for better alternatives.

I don't see the point in abandoning one way of looking at the world without a viable alternative.

[Eric Vail]

This is a key point, and one with which I whole-heartedly agree. But I still hold that science is not and cannot be theistic or athiestic, only the interpretations can be such.

One scientist looks at the data which has been collected and decides the idea of a creator is impossible. Another scientist looks at the same data and decides a creator must have existed. Both and right and both are wrong.


I think in my own explanation of things I muddied the waters by talking about data and interpretations (I apologize for the confusion I created). Thus, your reply does not get at the heart of what I was trying to say; rather, it reasserts the fact-value distinction, where science produces facts/data and we assign meaning and value to it.

The point of what I was trying to say is that we are subjects with linguistic construals of the world. There is no almighty science out there that conducts itself. It is humans with certain assumptions and linguistic construals of the world who are asking questions based on their presupositions, framing experiments based on those presuppositions, and taking in, processing, and giving meaning to results within their presupositions. What the linguistic turn enables us to see is the myth of objective science. What we are left with is linguistic subjects encountering the o/Other; in that relationship, there is discovery and adjustment. What Modernity must refuse is the first assertion of the linguistic turn--that scientists live and operate in a linguistic framework that is historically contingent. Your reply makes it sound like you would side with those who deny the contextual location of scientists and their craft. Is that right?

[Ryan Scott]

Your reply makes it sound like you would side with those who deny the contextual location of scientists and their craft. Is that right?


Not at all. I think the moment a scientist makes a conclusion they have left "science." I guess I view science the same way I view truth. I believe in absolute truth, but I don't believe in any person's ability to articulate it with complete accuracy.

That doesn't mean we stop looking for truth or attempting to experiment, record, and measure our world with as much objectivity as possible. We won't ever get it right, but that shouldn't stop us from refining our positions.

My impression of ID theory is that it is more of a philosophy than a science at this point. Philosophers have long used scientific findings as evidence for various beliefs. This is a positive, but it doesn't put it in the same category as evolutionary theory (which has its own brand of philosophy).

To me, the science is not there yet for ID. I hope these proponents continue to add to their scientific knowledge. I would love to see our perceptions of the world changed, because that means we're refining our knowledge. I just don't think ID is yet at the place where they can convincingly make the claims they are currently making.

[Hans Deventer]

The newest philosophical turn toward language is incredibly helpful to us. We once again have re-discovered the contextually contingent nature of truth/fact claims. We understand that we don't have direct contact with our world. We take everything in, process it, and understand it through a linguistic framework. We can know and understand according to how our linguistic construal of the world allows us to know and understand.

Thanks for saying so succinctly what frequently is stated in a myriad of words with half the lucidity. We need that.

[Thomas Oord]

Hans and Eric,

I like Eric's post too. But I do want to quibble with one line.

Eric says that we don't have direct contact with our world. He says that we understand it from a linguistic framework.

I think that we DO have direct contact with our world. I'm a realist. But I agree with Eric that we interpret through a framework -- linguistic and otherwise.

My point: we don't have to make the claim that we can't have direct contact to the world while making the claim that we can't know with fullness and certainty the world with which we have direct contact. We CAN have direct contact while still accessing that world through particular biases. The label "critical realism" is an attempt to account for this.

A bit of epistemology for what it's worth...which may not be much! : )

Tom

[Dennis Bratcher]

I fully sympathize with the heart of our Nazarene doctrine on scripture. I believe that we should not try to make scripture answer questions of history and science according to our modern methods. We must honor the genre of literature of the books of the bible and glean from those books what they are trying to say theologically about God, God's relation to us, our relation to God, and God's and our relationship to creation as a whole. I think that is what is at the heart of our Nazarene doctrine on scripture. However, we need to be cognizant of how much its wording is based on the cultural presuppositions of modernity: on the fact-value split. If we are not careful, by the way we define the relationship between revelation and the sciences, we will undercut the ability of God's self-revelation to provide the narrative (the worldview) through which we experience, process, and understand our world and the data (not facts) of the sciences.

I appreciate the analysis. This is precisely the point I have been making about Scripture in various ways for more than ten years here now (and for more than 30 in the Church; some of us were tending toward postmodern thinking before we ever heard the term). This does not affect the truth of Scripture, but it does help us understand how little of what we claim we know is absolute in the way many people want to think it is. It also highlights the importance of literary, cultural, and historical context in understanding both Scripture and theology, including classical and creedal theology, as well as expressing our own theology.

While I don't agree with everything Brian McLaren says, he is right that this is "the story we find ourselves in." "Certainty is overrated. God calls us to faith and to seek the Kingdom." The letters of Mother Teresa are a good example of what that looks like in real life. And we do that in a particular context, knowing that the truths we find, express, and live cannot be absolute; they can only be faithful testimony that becomes part of the story.

Grace and peace,

Dennis B.

[Daniel Hamlin]

I appreciate the analysis. This is precisely the point I have been making about Scripture in various ways for more than ten years here now (and for more than 30 in the Church; some of us were tending toward postmodern thinking before we ever heard the term). This does not affect the truth of Scripture, but it does help us understand how little of what we claim we know is absolute in the way many people want to think it is. It also highlights the importance of literary, cultural, and historical context in understanding both Scripture and theology, including classical and creedal theology, as well as expressing our own theology.


Dennis,
Thanks to you I have a new understanding of Scripture. Your post would not have made sense to me in the past, and I would probably have disagreed with it. But you recommended these resources. (http://www.naznet.com/community/showpost.php?p=176984&postcount=21) I got them via interlibrary loan, and am about halfway through each of them. This, combined with other reading I've been doing, has changed my view of Scripture. I now realize there is much more of a human and cultural influence in Scripture than my previously "God-dictated model" would have admitted. I also realize that although we may have an English translation of Scripture, it still doesn't necessarily make understanding the meaning of a text a simple exercise. And, like any other subject, the more I learn the more I realize I don't know.

Of course all this relates to the original point of this thread (Olivet prof barred because of belief in evolution) because many fellow Christians do not understand the context of Genesis and the influence the ANE culture had on the text. I'm not saying I fully understand the context either, but I do understand that the issue is more complex than a simple reading of the text would indicate.

[Eric Vail]

Hans and Eric,

I like Eric's post too. But I do want to quibble with one line.

Eric says that we don't have direct contact with our world. He says that we understand it from a linguistic framework.

I think that we DO have direct contact with our world. I'm a realist. But I agree with Eric that we interpret through a framework -- linguistic and otherwise.

My point: we don't have to make the claim that we can't have direct contact to the world while making the claim that we can't know with fullness and certainty the world with which we have direct contact. We CAN have direct contact while still accessing that world through particular biases. The label "critical realism" is an attempt to account for this.

A bit of epistemology for what it's worth...which may not be much! : )

Tom

Thanks, Tom, for the clarification. There is always the trouble of overstating things. I meant to get at the idea of not being able to stand outside of one's context--no bird's eye view--or a private, mediating language. I just got out of a lecture by Steve Long (actually a synopsis of his upcoming book on Wittgenstein and how he helps us bring together theologians who've fully embraced the linguistic turn and those who are holdouts of bygone days). With Long, I do think there is a real that we encounter. I simply want to say that the "truth" of that real is understood and expressed linguistically. The extent of the "truth" is bigger than any one language can express (or even the sum of all languages). Even saying that, however, is akin to a faith statement and is not necessarily verifiable.

[Dennis Bratcher]

Thanks, Tom, for the clarification. There is always the trouble of overstating things. I was meant to get at the idea of not being able to stand outside of one's context--no bird's eye view. I just got out of a lecture by Steve Long (actually a synopsis of his upcoming book on Wittgenstein and how he helps us bring together theologians who've fully embraced the linguistic turn and those who are holdouts of bygone days.

I'm not so sure the polarization of "those who have fully embraced the linguistic turn" and “those who are holdouts of bygone days” is helpful. Developments in either philosophy or hermeneutics are rarely that clean and well defined. Wittgenstein himself was notoriously ambiguous and dynamic, so that analysts have to speak of the early and later Wittgenstein.

Just as late nineteenth century exegesis was dominated by historical questions, so late twentieth century exegesis was preoccupied with literary questions. However, there are many of us who began with Gadamer and Ricour on through Thiselton, who were persuaded by Childs and Sanders that there must be some integration of both historical and literary aspects in a social matrix. The insights of Wittgenstein and his interpreters have facilitated moving away from a purely propositional approach to Scripture or theology. But I am not willing to accept the ascendancy of a purely linguistic approach to Scripture. That would make Scripture something other than what it claims to be even as literature.

The problem with a strictly philosophical approach to language and “language games” is that it does not, by definition, incorporate that social milieu (in some sense Wittgenstein violates his own methodology in making language abstract). Yet even Wittgenstein acknowledged that there is some correspondence between “facts” and the linguistic expression of them. In terms of biblical studies, this implies a much more negative conclusion than positive; that is, language is not suitable to do abstract logic in which there is no event to image or picture. In other words, he is dealing with the limits of language far more than a positive articulation of the use of language in hermeneutics.

With Long, I do think there is a real that we encounter. I simply want to say that the "truth" of that real is understood and expressed linguistically. The extent of the "truth" is bigger than any one language can express (or even the sum of all languages). Even saying that, however, is akin to a faith statement and is not necessarily verifiable.

I would substantially agree with this. I just don’t think language can be abstracted from a historical and cultural context. That would explain why I am not a fan of either “reader response criticism” or “agenda criticism,” both of which make the reader the center of the process. Certainly there are “two horizons” in hermeneutics (Thiselton) that we must take seriously, the horizon of the text and that of the reader (I would add a third, that of the setting of the text, no matter how unrecoverable it might be). I just don’t think we can elevate our horizon as primary and ignore or even downplay the horizon that gives shape and form to the text.

Grace and Peace,

Dennis B.

[Hans Deventer]

I really appreciate this discussion, therefore I moved it to a different thread. Keep it up!

[Eric Vail]

Dennis,

Long's thesis, in part, is an attempt to correct erroneous readings of Wittgenstein on the part of those in the linguistic-turn camp. They like to use him as a poster child for understanding language as abstracted from the real; this is what they claim his "language game" was all about. For them, truth is a function of language; it is completely contextual based on a linguistic worldview. There is no way to moderate between competing "truth" claims of varying contexts/construals; there is no absolute rationality or foundation (cf. Alasdair MacIntyre's critique of this). Long thinks this is a dead end for theology (since our talk is not linked to any real--e.g., God--and is nothing but the poorest form of fideism); it is also a false reading of Wittgenstein. For Wittgenstein, language is a function of truth--in perfect contrast to how many have read him and popularized him. The language game is still based on reality (without going the earlier analytic road of defining that correlation). The reason Long thinks Wittengstein is helpful, on the one hand, is that language is still related to the "truth" about the real. This is a necessary corrective to those who abstract language. On the other hand, language is a function of the "truth" about the real in a limited, contextual way ("truth" exceeds it). This is an appropriate corrective to classic metaphysics by the linguistic turn.

I realize that the caricature of the two sides in my original post lacked any sophistication or nuances of the actual positions. There are, nevertheless, debating sides on this issue and Long is trying to find a moderating, constructive way forward; he thinks recovering a more accurate reading of Wittgenstein is helpful in that. I'm looking forward to the release of his 460 page work later this year.

[Eric Vail]

I really appreciate this discussion, therefore I moved it to a different thread. Keep it up!

I must say I was a bit shocked to log in and find that I had started a thread in the theology section that I hadn't remembered starting. Thanks for the clarification.

[Hans Deventer]

With Long, I do think there is a real that we encounter. I simply want to say that the "truth" of that real is understood and expressed linguistically. The extent of the "truth" is bigger than any one language can express (or even the sum of all languages). Even saying that, however, is akin to a faith statement and is not necessarily verifiable.

Yes. But isn't the very foundation of our faith the idea that exactly through believing, we enter into a relationship with God who is the ultimate reality? Understanding that we still only see "in part"?

I think the deconstructive contributions of the post modernists are very worth while. If one of the foundational statements of our faith is that the truth is a person, we have for the last couple of centuries, been looking way too much for truth apart from Him. Which ultimately left us in a void where even the very language we used to communicate that "truth" has become suspect.

As a church, I think we need to start majoring again on this "relational truth".

[Thomas Oord]

Eric, Dennis, and others,

Thanks for the further clarification, Eric. I think we agree more than I previous thought. And I appreciate Dennis's additional comments.

A couple of further thoughts:

1. I took a course on Wittgenstein from DZ Phillips. His interpretation is precisely the one Long rejects. I side with Long here, at least in terms of how language should function in terms of our access to reality. I'm not a sophisticated enough interpreter of Wittgenstein to know whether Steve or DZ best interpret Wittgenstein.

2. While I appreciate the linguistic turn for what it tells us about the powerful role language plays in how we understand reality, I believe that we have a pre-linguistic access to reality. In other words, experience is prior to and more basic than language. My belief on this probably fits more comfortably in Long's analysis of Wittgenstein, but I don't know. I suspect that Long's proclivity toward seeing reality through Augustinian and anti-Enlightenment eyes, however, would lead him away from saying that our pre-linguistic access to reality is universal. I want to claim this pre-linguistic access IS universal. Here I part company with Wittgensteinian/narrative philosophers and theologians who soundly reject universal categories. I take it that I am rejecting Long's position as well.

Tom

[Dennis Bratcher]

Dennis,

Long's thesis, in part, is an attempt to correct erroneous readings of Wittgenstein on the part of those in the linguistic-turn camp. They like to use him as a poster child for understanding language as abstracted from the real; this is what they claim his "language game" was all about. For them, truth is a function of language; it is completely contextual based on a linguistic worldview. There is no way to moderate between competing "truth" claims of varying contexts/construals; there is no absolute rationality or foundation (cf. Alasdair MacIntyre's critique of this). Long thinks this is a dead end for theology (since our talk is not linked to any real--e.g., God--and is nothing but the poorest form of fideism); it is also a false reading of Wittgenstein. For Wittgenstein, language is a function of truth--in perfect contrast to how many have read him and popularized him. The language game is still based on reality (without going the earlier analytic road of defining that correlation). The reason Long thinks Wittengstein is helpful, on the one hand, is that language is still related to the "truth" about the real. This is a necessary corrective to those who abstract language. On the other hand, language is a function of the "truth" about the real in a limited, contextual way ("truth" exceeds it). This is an appropriate corrective to classic metaphysics by the linguistic turn.

I realize that the caricature of the two sides in my original post lacked any sophistication or nuances of the actual positions. There are, nevertheless, debating sides on this issue and Long is trying to find a moderating, constructive way forward; he thinks recovering a more accurate reading of Wittgenstein is helpful in that. I'm looking forward to the release of his 460 page work later this year.

From my limited understanding of Wittgenstein I think this is essentially what he is getting at so I would agree with this perspective, as indicated in my last post. I am resistant to abstraction, especially in relation to biblical studies but also in theological formulations. While I am not a theological empiricist, I'm not sure that we gain anything by trying to prove God or theological confessions logically as if a rationalist/mathematical approach is somehow truer. Certainly logical consistency and integration are important. Yet, we still need to acknowledge that even our logical systems are contextually based precisely because the language and categories we use for them is contextual. That is no less true for 21st century English than it was for 10th century BC Hebrew. While some view logical abstraction as a “pure” avenue to truth, I think it is just as contextual as any other form of discourse. And that includes the Early Church’s creedal confessions.

Grace and Peace,

Dennis B.